


CIA OCI CIWRSC 00781/69

~~Top Secret~~

No Foreign Dissem



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY REVIEW

SERIES "DL"

COPY DATE

17 DEC 1997

" THIS COPY MAY NOT BE FURTHER REPRODUCED

■ F(b)(1)
F(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

527

10 October 1969
SC No. 00781/69

82-228716

~~TOP SECRET~~

The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

WARNING

The WEEKLY REVIEW contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES

The WEEKLY REVIEW is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

The WEEKLY REVIEW MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be handled within the framework of specific dissemination control provisions of DCID 1/7.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

C O N T E N T S


(Information as of noon EDT, 9 October 1969)

PEKING AND MOSCOW TO HOLD BORDER TALKS

China's announcement on 7 October that it would enter talks with the USSR marks the first concrete result of the Kosygin-Chou meeting last month, and reflects recent efforts by both sides to reduce tensions along the border. The proposed talks appear to be only a tactical move, however, and will not resolve fundamental differences dividing the two states. ~~TOP SECRET~~


~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~




~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

PEKING AND MOSCOW TO HOLD BORDER TALKS

China's announcement on 7 October that it would enter talks with the USSR is the first fruit of the Kosygin-Chou meeting last month and reflects recent efforts by both sides to reduce tensions along the border. The two sides have agreed on a meeting of deputy ministers in Peking, and Western news reports, quoting Soviet sources, state that the talks will begin later this month. This has not been officially confirmed, however.



The Chinese announcement, while it obviously attempted

to enhance China's case in the dispute with Moscow, represented a noticeable retreat from Peking's border statement last May. At that time the Chinese indicated that discussions to ease the border conflict would require Moscow's prior recognition that the present boundary is based on "unequal treaties," and the negotiation of a new comprehensive settlement. Peking's announcement of 7 October, however, omitted this demand and stated that the "status quo" along the frontier

would be acceptable for the time being.

China's more flexible approach was dictated by Peking's concern over the current border crisis. The Chinese statement pointed to what it termed "nuclear war threats" by Moscow and disavowed any Chinese intention to launch an atomic attack. China's anxiety over the dangerous frontier situation is evident from pointed references in recent Chinese propaganda to "surprise nuclear attack," as well as indications that Peking is preparing contingency plans for extended conflict with Moscow.

The Soviet Union has been pressing China to hold border talks for some time, and the two may have already reached a limited understanding regarding steps to quiet the border before Peking released its statement.



Both sides have already taken limited steps to lessen outward signs of hostility apparently in anticipation of the

negotiations. Although Peking at first did not reciprocate Moscow's near halt on anti-Chinese propaganda following the Kosygin-Chou meeting, the Chinese softened their polemics against the USSR during national day ceremonies and reduced domestic anti-Soviet propaganda. The Soviets sent unusually cordial anniversary greetings to China this year, and Soviet ambassadors attended Chinese National day receptions in a number of foreign capitals for the first time in several years.

Nevertheless, the Chinese statement clearly implies that the proposed border talks will be only a tactical move designed to ease border tensions and will not resolve fundamental differences between the two states. A lengthy Chinese release of 8 October refuted in detail the USSR's most recent major statement on the border conflict and indicated Peking's intention to continue debate on its fundamental differences with Moscow. It also contained a five-point plan that established China's stand for the upcoming talks. Apparently to mask its retreat on the question of border talks with the Russians, Peking maintained that a final over-all settlement will still require Moscow to recognize the "unequal" treaties and conclude a new "equal" treaty with China. The statement emphasized, however, that pending such a development, both sides should maintain the status quo along the border and take steps, including troop withdrawals from disputed areas, to avert further conflict along the frontier.

